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Introduction
This publication reflects on one of the core aspects and indicators of societal 
resilience and national defence — why ordinary people are or are not willing 
to defend their own countries. Low willingness to defend a country may 
not necessarily be detrimental to its defence capabilities. However, under 
certain circumstances it can have profound effects. Low morale can have a 
significant impact on actions taken or not taken by decision makers, as well 
as armed forces. 
With the continuous weaponization of the information space and 
cyberspace, control over the minds of people has further intensified. Distant 
actors and factors can considerably influence views of domestic societies 
and exacerbate their perceptions. For this and other reasons, resilience of 
societies is becoming an ever-present theme of decision makers in NATO 
and its member states, as well as far beyond the Alliance. 
In this regard, three NATO member states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
present a compelling case for analysis. Since the Russian—Ukrainian conflict 
unfolded in 2014, all three along with other NATO Allies have significantly 
invested in their defence capabilities and national security. A notable focus 
has been the resilience of the societies, including attempts to increase the 
involvement of inhabitants in state defence activities. 
This publication re-visits the issue of willingness to defend one’s own 
country in the Baltic states. While in previous years multiple Baltic-centric 
academic publications have been presented, neither have they arrived at 
coherent conclusions, nor have they yet been sufficiently corroborated in 
fora of international experts’ interaction and presented in popular science. 
This publication opens with two chapters conceptualizing the willingness 
to defend and to fight for own country by Dr. Yao-Yuan Yeh from University 
of St. Thomas — Houston in the United States and Dr. Māris Andžāns from 
Rīga Stradiņš University (RSU) and the Latvian Institute of International 
Affairs (LIIA). With these chapters both authors bring to a wider audience 
results of their previous scientific studies. These are followed by a review 
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of the societal resilience in the agenda of NATO by Mārtiņš Vargulis, also 
from RSU and LIIA. Then, another section of Dr. Andžāns outlines statistical 
data on the willingness issue from the Baltic states from the beginning of 
1990s to the date. It then paves the way for country chapters on all three 
Baltic states which discuss situation in each of them. The chapter on Estonia 
was prepared by Dr. Ivo Juurvee of the International Centre for Defence 
and Security (ICDS) and the Estonian Military Academy, on Latvia  — 
by Aleksandra Palkova of RSU and LIIA, and on Lithuania  — by Dr. Ieva 
Gajauskaitė of the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania. 
The team of authors acknowledges the kind financial support of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in making this publication happen. 
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Public Preferences Between Wars  
of Necessity and Wars of Choice
Dr. Yao-Yuan Yeh (ORCID: 0000-0001-9160-1239), 
University of St. Thomas — Houston,  
Department of International Studies & Modern Languages
Since its earlier study by Mueller, the literature on public support for 
war or military intervention has been one of the most critical subfields 
in international relations for over five decades.1 Various scholars have 
found a series of factors explaining the fluctuation of public support for 
war, including the human and financial cost of war2, objectives of war3, 
multilateral linkages and institutions4, ethnicity5, partisanship6, education7, 
gender8, and war experience9. The accumulation of these research findings 
provides a strong benchmark for policymakers to assess the costs and 
impact of their foreign intervention policies and behaviours from the 
domestic audience. 
Nevertheless, the extant literature suffers two major shortcomings. First, 
most cases of this study focus on the Western states, especially the public 
opinion in the United States and United Kingdom, with a few exceptions.10 
This generates a generalizability issue as to whether the extant literature 
findings could apply to explain the fluctuations of public support for wars 
in non-Western contexts. Following the first notion, the second critical 
issue in the current studies of war support is that in most cases, since 
these are established powers, and their foreign military operations are 
all interventionist wars outside their homelands; to the public in these 
countries, whether to support these operations is considered as a choice 
instead of a “must.”
To elaborate, citizens in non-Western and non-major power states are 
more likely to be subject to the threat of war in which their livinghood may 
become the battlefield if the war occurs. For example, if China decides to 
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invade Taiwan for the purpose of unification, then Taiwan will likely be 
the battlefield where Taiwanese citizens have to defend the island from a 
Chinese military operation. Another vivid example is Russia’s military 
intervention in Ukraine. What Ukrainians needed to consider was whether 
they would stand up and fight against Russian troops and how exactly they 
could defend against Russian troops in the Ukrainian homeland. Unlike the 
US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US citizens only needed 
to consider whether they should support the administration’s decisions in 
waging wars on foreign soil without worrying that the wars could spread 
back to the US homeland. Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that the 
mechanisms driving the public support for war outside the Western contexts 
are different. That is, how the public views wars of choice is not the same as 
wars of necessity.
Three reasons support this articulation. First, the research on war 
support indicates that when the public learns about casualties originated 
from local neighbourhoods, they would reduce their support for this 
ongoing military operation.11 Wars would certainly incur a higher number 
of casualties, and these casualties, undoubtedly, would come from the 
homeland. However, whether the public would simply reduce their support 
of self-defence willingness due to the increase in casualties is not clear, 
since losing the battle may mean the elimination of their beloved sovereign 
state and the political institutions and society they embrace. 
Second, we often see that countries facing wars of necessity rely on a 
conscription system instead of a voluntary military system. Research has 
shown that the employment of conscription systems has a substantial impact 
on public support for wars.12 The conscription enhances the capability of 
defending from an aggressor and helps the public be more aware of the cost 
and consequence of war. Some research has indicated that the public will 
be more supportive of conflict when they consider their training could help 
them better prepare to defend themselves.13
The reason is obvious. When a large segment of the population is 
required to serve in the military, the public is generally more aware of 
the costs and benefits of an armed conflict. Moreover, in the event where 
people’s living environment will be intruded by the war, the public will 
certainly take a different type of consideration when judging the utility of 
defending their livinghood, given the fact that more accurate information 
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and understanding of warfare is aware by the general public. Thus, with 
the conscription system installed, the general public would certainly take 
a different standpoint when considering their support of self-defence, 
especially in the case of wars of necessity. 
Third, considering those countries that face immediate threats from 
aggressors, such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, they often need to 
rely on other major powers to support their military operations against the 
aggressors. In this scenario, public support for wars of necessity would have 
to channel in the security commitment from the major powers and their 
likelihood of intervention if the war occurs. The literature on war support 
has found that the public tends to feel more secure and confident with their 
capability of defending from aggressors if an ally provides a strong security 
commitment.14 Nevertheless, some do disagree with this view and contend 
that the ally’s security provision may invoke backlash. Scholars have found 
that the public in Japan and South Korea perceive the United States troops 
who station in these two countries as a source of social chaos and unease.15 
By far, it is clear that the public may react in distinctive ways toward 
wars of necessity and wars of choice. In this chapter, I discuss how the 
existing mechanisms explaining public support for war could be altered 
under the condition of wars for necessity. Yeh and Wu provided an empirical 
examination of public support for wars of necessity with a case study on 
Taiwan.16 It would serve as the benchmark for our theoretical reasonings 
below. I focus my discussion on four main factors — costs of war, objectives 
of war, ethnicity, and multilateralism. 
As mentioned before, the literature of public support for wars of choice 
has generated a solid conclusion that war costs, such as casualties and 
financial expenses, would lead to a lower level of support for this military 
operation, as evidenced in the Vietnam War, US military intervention in 
Somalia, Iraq War in 2003, and many others. In general, public support for 
war declines along with the increase of war costs. 
However, in the context of public support for wars of necessity, it may 
not work in the same venue. In studies of public support for wars of choice, 
the costs are tangible and often can be observed in the real world (unless it 
is an experimental study with a hypothetical scenario). In studies of public 
support for wars of necessity, the costs are always hypothetical. That is, it 
is impossible to examine the public support for wars of necessity with a 
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war onset as the subjects’ livinghood is invaded by perpetrators at the same 
moment. All we can understand is the willingness to defend the subjects’ 
homeland before the war occurs.
Therefore, whether the public facing wars of necessity would be relatively 
more supportive of self-defence is likely to depend on how it views the 
importance of defending the country. This means, the willingness of self-
defence is highly contingent on the perceived objectives and values among 
the public when the war breaks out. If defending the state’s sovereignty, 
its political institution, and the society is considered the top priority of its 
citizens, then war costs may not be associated with the degree of willingness 
of self-defence. On the other hand, if the public deems the invasion from a 
foreign state as favourable, or at least is indifferent to the idea of replacing 
the current government with the one from the invader, then they may be 
unwilling to support the hypothetical war and are very sensitive to the war 
costs. 
To be specific, in the scenario whether the public is choosing to support 
an intervention war where their homeland is intact, which applies to every 
foreign intervention operation carried out by a major military power, such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom, the public can comprehend 
the war objectively and rationally in a simple cost and benefit calculation. 
But when the war is determined to intrude on the citizens’ livinghood, it is 
a matter of life and death, and the public does not have a choice. Therefore, 
when the public faces the potential challenge of wars of necessity, they 
rely on another rationale to consider whether they are willing to protect 
their home country. This includes whether protecting their political 
institutions and society is critical in their value system, and also whether 
they perceive the enemy is generally an acceptable alternative ruler due to 
ethnical similarity, economic incentives, party identification if there are 
political parties promoting a narrative favouring surrender to the potential 
perpetrator, etc. 
In addition to a different calculation of war costs and other political and 
social factors when comparing public support for wars of necessity and wars 
of choice, the influence of multilateralism is critical in gauging the will 
to defend. This is particularly the case for those small powers under the 
threats of major powers. As the nature of this war is likely to be unbalanced, 
the public of those small states tends to evaluate the chances of a successful 
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defence or deterrence against the major power invader to be lower. Thus, 
whether another major state or a set of strong powers are willing to bear the 
costs of war collectively is important in citizens’ calculation of war success 
and leads to a higher level of showing their defence willingness.17 However, 
alternatively, citizens may free ride the major powers’ commitment, and 
they may instead become unwilling to defend their home country. Future 
studies may discover more evidence in this domain. 
Taiwan would serve as an excellent example to illustrate the mechanisms 
mentioned above. Its complicated historical past, including the Japanese 
colonization and the loss of war to the Communist Party of China and the 
Mainland China by the Nationalist party (Kuomintang) and its authoritarian 
rules before democratization in 1996, the public in Taiwan used to encounter 
some identity crises in their entangling cultural, social, and historical 
traits with China. On the other hand, China has also tried its best to co-
opt Taiwanese business and political elites and wished this could attract the 
public to be more leaning toward the idea of unification without warfare. 
However, as the majority of Taiwanese has claimed a Taiwanese identity18 in 
recent years and the favouritism toward unification declined significantly19, 
China has resorted to coercion with the People’s Liberation Army’s fighter 
jets crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait constantly since the 
campaigning period of the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election to even now 
in 2021.20 Aside from the bilateral interaction, the US-China relationship 
also plays a critical role as we are witnessing another great power 
competition after the Cold War, starting during the US-China trade war in 
2018.21 Compared to China’s military threats to Taiwan, the United States 
is making its stance over Taiwan’s security clearer without fundamentally 
altering its foreign policy doctrine, Strategic Ambiguity, toward the Strait.22 
This evidences that studies of public support for wars of necessity are ever 
more critical than now. 
As Yeh and Wu detail in their study of the war of necessity in Taiwan 
against a potential invasion from China: “Although there are several reasons 
to postulate that the public facing a war of necessity will react differently 
from those facing wars of choice in Western states, we found support for 
most of the indicators such as principle policy objectives, multilateralism, 
ethnicity, partisanship, generation, and education. This result increases our 
confidence of the generalizability of existing findings in the literature.”23 
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In addition, other research also has shown that the security commitment 
from the United States is vital to the self-defence willingness among the 
Taiwanese public.24 To enhance the generalizability of the research on the 
willingness of self-defence for wars of necessity, replications of the research 
by Yeh and Wu and its extension are urgent.
Taken together, individual preferences of wars of choice compared to 
wars of necessity is certainly different. This chapter provides an overview 
and illustrates some mechanisms that would extend our understanding of 
this comparison. Scholars and policymakers have to consider these visible 
and vital differences to better understand the public support for wars of 
necessity.
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Conceptualizing Willingness to Defend 
and to Fight for Own Country1
Dr. Māris Andžāns (ORCID: 0000-0002-4695-3929), 
Rīga Stradiņš University and Latvian Institute of International Affairs 
Willingness to fight war(fare), willingness to fight for own country 
and willingness to defend one’s own country has been the subject to 
various academic studies. The issue has been approached from different 
perspectives, though usually relying on the interpretation of quantitative 
data acquired via public polls. 
The most comprehensive research in this field has been conducted by 
Inglehart, Puranen and Welzel, as summarized in their article of 2015. The 
article presents four hypotheses. First, in a cross-sectional aspect, societies 
with higher life opportunities and existential security level emphasize pro-
choice values and thus demonstrate lower willingness to risk their lives in 
wars. Second, in a longitudinal aspect, the stronger growth in pro-choice 
values, the sharper the decline in willingness to endanger their lives. 
Third, in a multi-level aspect, societies with more common pro-choice 
values inflict members of those societies with lower levels of willingness 
to imperil themselves. Fourth, in a historical aspect, humiliation in past 
wars decreases the willingness to fight. All in all, the authors argued that 
increased life opportunities contribute to higher valuation of lives and, 
accordingly, lead to a lower willingness to risk lives.2 
Several other hypotheses deserve attention as well. Díez-Nicolás 
concluded that the level of national pride, as well as the level of confidence 
in national armed forces is the most accurate prognosticator for the 
willingness to fight for own country  — the higher the national pride and 
confidence in national armed forces, the higher the willingness to fight 
for the country. According to him, this trend can be observed in countries 
with significant differences, and it tends to be stable over long periods of 
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time.3 Also, Puranen and Torgler have underlined the strong link between 
higher level of national pride and trust in armed forces, and the willingness 
to fight. Torgler also added the trust in governments and legal systems as 
indicators of higher levels.4 
Several studies have noted that the willingness to fight for one’s 
country significantly depends on the historical, social and political context. 
Previous research, also that of Inglehart, Puranen and Welzel, has found 
two groups of countries standing out amongst others — the World War Two 
Axis powers (Germany and Japan in particular) and the Nordic countries. 
In the former, willingness to fight is low,5 while in the latter it surpasses 
the predictions of other hypotheses and indicators.6 Inglehart, Puranen and 
Welzel (and Puranen in a separate article) have explained these findings 
with the lifestyles of the Nordics and the vicinity of Russia which results 
in associating defence of a state with defence and promotion of values.7 
Similarly, Díez-Nicolás observed that entanglement in ongoing conflicts and 
external threats can raise the level of willingness.8
Studies have also assessed regional, cultural and socio-economic contexts 
as determinants. Díez Nicolás concluded that the highest willingness to 
fight can be observed in Asian Sino-Confucian, Islamic and Sub-Saharan 
countries, while the lowest in West European Catholic and Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Baltic states here were classified among West European Protestant 
countries).9 A WIN/Gallup International Global Survey from 2014 concluded 
that the highest willingness to fight for one’s country is in the Middle East 
and Northern Africa, as well as in Asia (also among Muslims and Hindus 
in terms of religious affiliation), whereas it is the lowest in Western Europe 
and North America (also among Protestants).10 Furthermore, Anderson, 
Getmansky, and Hirsch-Hoefler concluded that in societies with higher 
income inequality the willingness to fight for one’s own country is lower 
compared to those with lower inequality levels.11
Among research focusing on choices of individuals, it has often been 
observed that indicators such as gender and attitude towards the country 
are notable factors. While various studies tend to arrive at different 
conclusions on certain indicators, many have concluded that men are more 
likely to fight than women12 (some others note also a younger age13 and 
marital status14), as well as that individuals with higher national pride and 
trust in the armed forces are willing to fight15 (some also note the related 
16
trust in the government and legal system, as well as religiousness and 
ideological inclination towards the right).16 While the level of education has 
been discussed as a factor, Anderson, Getmansky, and Hirsch-Hoefler noted 
a lack of evidence for interrelationship between education of individuals and 
willingness to fight for country.17 
Other literature has assessed the impact of socio-economic factors 
on individual’s choices. Anderson and Hirsch-Hoefler18 and Anderson, 
Getmansky, and Hirsch-Hoefler evaluated the link between economic 
equality and willingness to fight. The latter research concluded that in 
societies with low levels of inequality there is no difference in willingness to 
fight among the rich and the poor. However, as inequality in society grows, 
rich people become less willing to fight compared to their poor counterparts 
(poorer individuals are more prone to mobilize to fight).19 Torgler assessed 
the impact of divergence between benefits and costs in willingness to go to 
war. He did not find sufficient evidence that calculation between benefits 
and costs significantly influences the choice of individuals.20
Finally, Horowitz and Levendusky in an experiment in the United States 
assessed the impact of conscription in supporting warfare. They concluded 
that mandatory service reduces public support for wars. The most likely 
explanation is self-interest of individuals, i.e., preference not to risk their 
own life as conscripts.21 
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NATO and the Role of Societal 
Resilience and Willingness  
to Defend Own Country 
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Rīga Stradiņš University and Latvian Institute of International Affairs 
Global connectivity, technological development, information, and psycho-
logical operations as well as other evolving elements present new security 
challenges for NATO, especially in relation to the resilience of society. 
Alongside strengthening collective defence, building resilience through 
civil preparedness and innovation will be a game-changer for the ability to 
withstand any form of aggression in future. In the long-term perspective, it 
will require a swift adaptation to new innovations and technology, as well 
as the readiness and willingness of society to take a part in defending own 
country. State and non-state actors will need to be engaged to maintain and 
enhance the security of Allies. The resilience of the society is becoming 
one of the dominating centres of gravity within the context of modern 
warfare. It is a precondition of credible deterrence and defence posture — a 
complementing aspect to the collective defence. 
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine stimulated discussion of societal elements 
in the overall deterrence and defence planning among Allies. Although the 
concept within NATO is still under development, several conclusions can 
already be drawn about how the Alliance perceives the resilience and what 
impact it may have on the overall NATO’s adaptation process, including 
within the discussion surrounding the formulation of the new Strategic 
Concept. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse what collective 
defence measures have been adopted in recent years and how they relate to 
the overall resilience of the Alliance and willingness of the society to defend 
own country — and those of Allies.
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Renaissance and dynamics of the resilience within NATO
Considering the lessons learned from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine 
since 2014, the issue of the resilience of Alliance became an indispensable 
element. From the Wales Summit in 2014 to the Brussels Summit in 2021, 
the concept of resilience has undergone a transformation. In the declaration 
adopted by the Heads of State and Government in 2014, the concept of 
resilience was described only through the prism of the cyber dimension. 
The Enhanced Cyber  Defence Policy was endorsed. Overall, it contributed to 
the fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks. It recalled that the “fundamental 
cyber defence responsibility of NATO is to defend its own networks, and that 
assistance to Allies should be addressed in accordance with the spirit of 
solidarity, emphasizing the responsibility of Allies to develop the relevant 
capabilities for the protection of national networks”.1
At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, resilience was further emphasized in the 
context of the overall agenda. It was linked not only to the cyber dimension, 
but to the wider debate on societal resilience. In addition to reinforcing 
collective defence and enhancing capabilities, strengthening resilience was 
described as an incremental pillar of adaptation process of the Alliance. 
As stated in the declaration, “[Heads of State and Government] made a 
commitment to continue to enhance resilience and to maintain and further 
develop individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed 
attack”.2 
The policy adapted at the Warsaw Summit emphasized that resilience 
must be seen first and foremost through the prism of national responsibility — 
as an expression of Article 3. Heads of State and Government in 2016 
reinforced the Resilience Guidelines that were adopted by the ministers 
of defence in 2016 prior to the Summit. Resilience Guidelines set by NATO 
focused “on continuity of government and essential services, security of 
critical civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces with civilian 
means”3. By adopting a new sustainability policy, the Allies acknowledged 
that the security issue was complex and comprehensive, requiring a 
coordinated and unconventional solutions. It also pointed to the need for a 
long-term development and adaptation. To face the challenges of the new 
security environment, Allies need to develop critical civilian capabilities, 
alongside and in support of military capabilities. It also requires intensified 
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and integrated cooperation between entire government and private sector. 
Thus, strengthening whole of government approach. The policy required 
resilience to be seen in the context of NATO’s defence capabilities and 
operational planning. This is a new precondition for strengthening overall 
deterrence and defence posture.
Unlike previous summits, the policy in Brussels Summit in 2021 
envisaged an increasing role for NATO in developing and advancing the 
requirements of resilience. Although the perception of Heads of State and 
Government that resilience is first and foremost a national responsibility 
hasn’t significantly transformed, a number of strengthening elements in 
2021 have been introduced. In the light of the collective commitments set out 
in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, a number of integrated measures 
have been adopted to strengthen the overall resilience of the Alliance. 
It is important that the principles of resilience are linked to any type of 
contingency — peace, crisis, as well as to conflict. In the Brussels Summit 
it was agreed that “Allies will develop a proposal to establish, assess, 
review, and monitor resilience objectives to guide nationally developed 
resilience goals and implementation plans [and] that it will be up to each 
individual Ally to determine how to establish and meet national resilience 
goals and implementation plans, allowing them to do so in a manner that is 
compatible with respective national competences, structures, processes and 
obligations”4. Thus, the role of the Alliance in the overall supervision of the 
resilience increased. 
In order to fulfil the Alliance’s core tasks and strengthen the credibility 
of the Alliance resilience is essential and of utmost importance. Therefore, 
at the Brussels Summit leaders went further and agreed that resilience 
isn’t just a national responsibility, but also a collective commitment. The 
importance of the resilience in the overall discussion within NATO was 
shown by the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Centre for Resilience that is 
located in Romania. 
To ensure a coherent approach, the Alliance’s role is expected to increase 
in the future. Today, each country still has a different understanding of 
what measures need to be taken and what effect they have on the overall 
sustainability of the Alliance. The creation of guidelines and rules is a step 
in the right direction in the context of the overall adaptation process of the 
Alliance.
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Strengthening (improving) the concept of resilience
According to Sun Tzu, supremacy derives from a conquest without fighting. 
In the book “Art of War”, he stressed the excellence of victorious leaders who 
had won before a battle even started, opposed to the failures of those who 
first went to war, attempting to win thereafter. Thus, power derives from 
the skill to break the enemy’s resilience without firing a single shot. The 
same importance of the resilience could be perceived through the prism 
of deterrence. As very clearly described by the Ministry of Defence of the 
United Kingdom “... deterrence is a general reputation, generated over time 
by a posture (and visible actions) that portrays an image of credibility and 
resilience regarding any hostile intent. This reputation is built by how 
adversaries interpret that posture. It is essential to understand that posture 
is not the same as reputation”5. In practice, deterrence by denial consists of 
resilience and entanglement. It is vital to understand the value of resilience, 
indisputably the less glamorous part of deterrence and one that has long 
been treated as an afterthought6. Despite this neglected position, deterrence 
by resilience can significantly change the attacker’s cost-benefit calculation. 
Successful deterrence is based on resilience. 
Recognising the complexity and importance of the issue of the resilience, 
the Alliance has gone further and set out additional steps to take a whole-
of-government approach to enhancing the resilience of societies. Whole-of-
government approach involving most of the government institutions into 
defence planning is of utmost importance to ensure resilience in various 
dimensions and fields. In this context, the Alliance has adopted “seven 
NATO Baseline Requirements for national resilience, through enhanced 
civil-military cooperation and civil preparedness; closer engagement 
with populations, the private sector, and non-governmental actors; and 
the centres of expertise on resilience established by Allies”7. Especially, 
civil preparedness has been perceived as a central pillar of the whole-of-
government approach. It is a “game changer” for the overall Alliance’s 
deterrence and defence posture. Enhancing civil preparedness will be crucial 
in ensuring the credibility of the posture. NATO’s increased role and shared 
responsibility among Allies will be a important precondition to deliver it. 
Among other critical infrastructure, supply chains, and communication 
information networks, including 5G, are the most common elements found 
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in the Alliance’s debate on resilience. Given the growing activity of Russia 
and China, the ability to meet these challenges is becoming vital to the 
overall deterrence and defence posture of the Alliance. Launching the 
#NATO2030 process, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed 
out that “credible deterrence and defence are central, because “the best 
way to prevent a conflict, is to remove any room for doubt, any room for 
miscalculation about NATO’s readiness, willingness to protect all Allies.”8 
He also underscored that resilience is key and “that resilience  — be it 
infrastructure, telecommunications, 5G or healthcare, access to protective 
equipment — all of that matters for the civilian society, but it actually also 
matters for NATO as a military alliance and our military capabilities.”9 This 
confirms the assumption that, whatever adaptation processes take place, the 
overall resilience of the Alliance is one of the key pillars of the future of the 
Alliance. 
Brussels Summit in 2021 was affected not only by the adaptation 
processes that began at the Wales and Warsaw summits and the increasing 
notion of the importance of technologies, but also by the global pandemic 
and the Alliance’s ability to meet such unprecedented challenges. This has 
added a new dimension to the resilience. The challenges posed by COVID-19 
call for new measures. The compatibility of the civil, environmental, 
health, economic and political spheres with the military takes on an even 
more pronounced hue. Like other organizations, NATO was not prepared to 
face challenges at the beginning of the pandemic. Military exercises were 
abolished, decision-making was interrupted, and coordination between the 
Allies was undermined. Although the Alliance had the ability to find short-
term solutions more rapidly than other organizations, long-term resilience to 
such challenges needs to be strengthened. The need for military involvement 
and integration with the civilian sphere in today’s hybrid warfare will only 
increase. Separating them would be an inappropriate approach, which 
would undermine the Alliance’s resilience to external threats, which may 
be caused by both national ambitions and international disasters. Success 
will be based on NATO’s ability to coordinate and supervise the integration 
of civil and military sectors.
Current challenges require NATO to continue to strengthen its 
resilience. Joint and coordinated action between the Allies will be an 
essential precondition for promoting common sustainability. At the same 
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time, cooperation with partners and international organizations matters. 
First, it provides the best solutions for strengthening resilience. Second, it 
mutually strengthens and enhances overall security in the Euro-Atlantic 
area. In this context, the cooperation with the EU is vital. In a crisis and 
conflict situation, the EU’s role in providing civilian support to military 
operations will be crucial in the context of the success of the joint operation. 
Strengthening the overall resilience of NATO and EU requires enhanced 
cooperation between both organizations in the form of joint civil-military 
exercises and common regulations, as well as information exchange.
Shared threat perception and solidarity  
as preconditions of resilience
Strength and power are elements that Russia respects. To have credible 
deterrence, the Alliance needs to strengthen and to demonstrate its ability 
to use might and power, if that is required. A demonstration of strength, 
which could be expressed both in large-scale exercises and deployment of 
permanent Allied forces, is the best signal to the aggressor that the defence 
of each country, and thus of the Alliance as a whole, is being seriously 
planned, tested and valued. Softening and reducing positions will be 
perceived as a point of weakness that Russia will utilize according to its 
own interests. Therefore, measures adapted since 2014, including in the 
Baltic region, is the (minimum) basis in the current security environment 
on which the Alliance’s common deterrence and defence policy should be 
further strengthened.
Solidarity and the desire to protect the country are two other highly 
valued elements in the administration of Vladimir Putin. According to 
Russia’s General Gerasimov’s doctrine, influencing public sentiment in a 
way that provides a basis for military intervention is one of the main centres 
of gravity of the operation. Accordingly, the strength (or weakness) of states 
depends directly on society’s willingness to protect its country as well as 
Allies, if that is required. 
One of the essential elements of the resilience and solidarity is the common 
understanding of the level and classification of threats. As mentioned in 
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the previous chapters, following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, several 
decisions were taken at the Wales Summit in 2014 and at the Warsaw 
Summit in 2016, which illustrated the change of consciousness and mindset 
among Allies. Both summits indicated that Allies have “come to” a common 
threat perception where Russia’s aggression in Ukraine creates a long-term 
consequence for the transatlantic security. A common understanding of 
Russia’s ambitions and its revisionist approach in the international arena 
was demonstrated. That was a turning point for the security of the Baltic 
states. Prior to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, several Central and Western 
European Allies were rather interested in normalizing relations with 
Russia, even in the form of civil-military cooperation. From the perspective 
of Baltic states, such an approach was considered as unfavourable and risky, 
based on the national threat assessment. Nevertheless, the Heads of State 
and Government in Wales and Warsaw were able to agree on far-reaching 
measures to strengthen the Alliance’s collective defence and rapid response 
capabilities, as well as the re-enforcing of the central role of transatlantic 
relations in ensuring security, while maintaining a clear and common 
understanding of the threat and challenges the Alliance is facing.
Although there was emerging unity among the Allies at the 2014 and 
2016 summits, in recent years, national interests and perceptions have 
come to the fore again. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and aggressive 
assertiveness expressed in many forms are no longer a unifying threat that 
bring all these actors together. In this regard, Baltic states have a completely 
different perception compared to other Allies  — being very sceptical of 
Russian military activism in the Baltic Sea and other surrounding regions. 
Consequently, resilience in the context of NATO must be seen in the broader 
sense of solidarity and unity among Allies. Although resilience is primarily 
a national responsibility, it is the shared understanding among Allies that 
will determine the extent to which collective defence is corresponding with 
existing challenges. To ensure the willingness and readiness of society to 
be involved in defending itself and its Allies, a common threat perception 
communicated by the political and military leaders is vital.
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Understanding the necessity and willingness  
to defend (not only) own country
The willingness to protect Allies and engage in conflict (if that is the 
case) is an essential deterrent element. There are several ways in which 
the willingness to protect the Allies can be projected, demonstrated 
and analysed. One of the most striking forms of expression, which has 
contributed to the calculation on the aggressor’s side, is the deployment of 
Allied forces in the Baltic states and Poland - enhanced Forward Presence 
(eFP). Within the discussion of the deployment, issue of the willingness to 
defend other Allies became relevant. Overall, it highlighted the challenges 
and lack of unity among Allies, as there are, for instance, still several 
Allies that are not present in any of the eFP battlegroups. It illustrates the 
perception of both political leaders and societies of various Allies that differ 
from one Ally to another.
This doesn’t imply that Article 5 has been challenged. It remains the 
cornerstone of the Alliance deterrence and defence posture. In addition, 
NATO as a whole continues to be supported by the vast majority. Although 
tensions and issues exist among Allies, NATO’s overall support and position 
is rock solid. However, when it comes to the practical steps, opinions of NATO 
and issues related to the Alliance vary widely across the countries. The 
sentiment of the society highlights the challenges of the overall willingness 
to step on the soil of an Ally from the very outset of the conflict or crisis. 
According to the survey made by Pew Research Center, “when asked if their 
country should defend a fellow NATO Ally against a potential attack from 
Russia, a median of 50% across 16 NATO member states say their country 
should not defend an Ally, compared with 38% who say their country should 
defend an Ally against a Russian attack”10. Half of the Allies’ societies are 
against involvement in the conflict with Russia. This type of research only 
stimulates Russia’s appetite to test the Alliance’s unity and solidarity.
According to other survey made by the Institute of Land Warfare, 
significant negative indicators of political will do exist because of following 
reasons:
1. “NATO lacks sufficient key leaders who support the use of force to 
defend the Baltics.
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2. NATO displays evidence of diverging alliance missions, threats, 
interests, perceptions of Russia and domestic interests, all of which 
diminish common understanding of the threat.
3. NATO retains significant strength in the third component — a 
potentially-effective solution  — due to latent military and economic 
power”.11
The (un)willingness to protect Allies poses significant challenges in the 
context of collective defence. First of all, it affects the speed of decision-
making. Aware that there is no consensus among the Allies, Russia will be 
able to exploit the lack of political will. By pursuing covert hybrid warfare, 
Russia may thus deter most of the Allies from engaging in the first phase 
of a conflict or crisis. Second, it may provide an incentive to Russia to 
implement a large-scale Anti Access / Area Denial (A2/AD) scenario. A 
large-scale and unexpected conventional attack could lead to the blockade of 
the Baltic states from the rest of the Alliance. In this case, the reinforcement 
of Allied forces will be crucial. The involvement of the Allies will be based 
on the willingness (support) of societies to protect the Baltic states, which 
have emerged during peacetime. Finally, the public’s willingness to defend 
its Allies is particularly important in the context of new threats: cyber, 
strategic communications (disinformation), energy, etc. In order to meet 
the challenges posed by Russia (as well as China), the Alliance’s common 
resilience and the Allies’ willingness to improve each other is of utmost 
importance.
Conclusions
Strengthening deterrence and resilience is a permanent task. The Baltic 
region borders with an actor who exploits the opponent’s weaknesses in 
its own interests. To deter such an adversary, the Alliance must continue 
to strengthen its capabilities, ensure an enhanced and integrated Allied 
force presence, and send signals that any form of aggression will provoke 
a broad and rapid collective response. The credibility of the messaging will 
be determined by society’s desire to protect more than just its own country. 
The willingness to protect the Alliance is, therefore, a cornerstone of the 
deterrence and defence posture. 
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From NATO’s perspective, it is premature to predict that resilience in near 
or mid-term future will become, first and foremost, NATO’s responsibility. 
Member States are expected strengthen their resilience internal and 
external shocks, thus, overall enhancing the Alliance’s ability to adapt to 
new challenges. In this context, Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty is a 
complementary element to Article 5. By strengthening national resilience, 
NATO’s collective defence is enhanced. If each member state individually 
and the Alliance as a whole is resilient to external attacks, this makes the 
Alliance stronger as a whole. In this context, it is important to identify the 
innovative areas and niche skills that each member state can contribute to 
a common NATO capability pot. It must be rather a complementary than 
competitive process. In this regard, NATO as unifying framework will 
be crucial to set the agenda and specific requirements when it comes to 
ensuring resilient society. 
However, in recent years, differences among Allies in their threat 
perception as well as their willingness to defend other Allies have intensified. 
The ability to adapt to uncertain and ever-changing international security 
environment has been a precondition for NATO’s success and development, 
and so will be the issue of resilience and willingness to engage. Since the 
founding of NATO in 1949, the Alliance has experienced several internal 
and external shocks that have eventually affected NATO’s future existence. 
NATO has been able to adapt and find solutions to the challenges it faces. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a wake-up call that highlighted 
gaps and weaknesses in the Alliance’s perception, approach, and action. 
It also illustrated the importance of willingness, readiness, and ability of 
the society to take part in defence against any form of the attack. Without 
increased willingness to defend whole Alliance the adaptation process of the 
deterrence and defence posture is useless. Allied leaders and the Alliance 
as a whole need to find ways to raise awareness of the society that could 
stimulate the overall willingness to engage, if that is necessary. Otherwise, 
it creates an additional appetite for the adversary to test the unity and 
solidarity of the Alliance.
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Willingness to defend or fight for own country has been tracked by various 
sociological surveys. For the Baltic states, the earliest data goes back to the 
European Values Study of 1990, when all three countries formally were still 
part of the Soviet Union. 
While methods and questions have varied across the surveys, 
nevertheless, they provide a generally coherent picture, as Figure 1 suggests. 
The positive answers of respondents, i.e., expression on willingness to 
defend or fight for the country (in percent), are mapped year by year (some 
years contain more than one source while others contain no data at all). 
The data mapped in Figure 1 draw from various sources, including 
polls from 1990 to 2020 for the European Values Study2 and the World 
Values Survey,3 a WIN/Gallup International Global Survey poll,4 multiple 
surveys ordered by the Ministry of Defence of Estonia (polls conducted by 
Turu-uuringute, Faktum uuringukeskus and Saar Poll),5 a survey of the 
Civic Empowerment Index6 and project “Subjective Security in a Volatile 
Geopolitical Context: Traits, Factors and Individual Strategies” discussed in 
the publication of Vileikienė and Janušauskienė,7 a poll by Spinter Tyrimai 
commented in a publication of Sutkus,8 polls ordered by the Ministry of 
Defence of Latvia (polls conducted by SKDS),9 a poll presented in publication 
of Andžāns, Sprūds and Bruģe (poll conducted by SKDS),10 a poll presented 
in a publication of Ainė Ramonaitė, Petronytė-Urbonavičienė, Skirkevičius 
and Vosylius,11 a poll presented in the publication by Andžāns and Sprūds 
(poll conducted by Turu-uuringute, SKDS and Baltic Surveys),12 a poll 
presented in the publication by Bērziņa and Zupa (poll conducted by Latvian 
Facts),13 as well as a poll from an upcoming publication of Andžāns (polls 
conducted by Turu-uuringute, SKDS and Baltic Surveys).14
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Figure 1: Willingness to defend and fight for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania according to 
polls from 1990 to 2020 (percent of the respondents).
According to Figure 1, the richest pool of public data is available for 
Estonia, while the scarcest — for Lithuania. Situation in 1990s can be traced 
via the contribution of the data from European Values Study and the World 
Values Survey. The latest decade provides the most intense pool of data as 
both the polls ordered by state institutions, as well as those requested by 
academic studies have multiplied. 
As the mapping results exemplify, since the beginning of 2000s, the 
highest level of willingness has been consistently recorded in Estonia, while 
Latvia and Lithuania have trailed. Also, data for Estonia have been more 
consistent, even with different sources of survey data per one year and in 
the following years. 
Moving further, Figure 2 and Figure 3 offer a closer look on the situation 
in the Baltics with assistance of two nationally representative polls which 
were conducted simultaneously across all three states in November and 
December of 2019 and 2020, accordingly: 870 and 876 respondents surveyed 
in Estonia (face-to-face interviews combined with internet interviews), 1001 
and 1003 in Latvia, and 892 and 970 respondents in Lithuania (in both 












































































In both polls, each respondent was asked the following question  — “If 
[Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania] was attacked, should inhabitants of [Estonia, 
Latvia, or Lithuania], in your opinion, take up arms to defend themselves 
in all situations, even if the outcome seemed uncertain?” The available 
answers were “certainly yes”, “rather yes”, “rather no”, “certainly no” and 
“hard to answer”.
Figure 2: Willingness to defend Baltic states according to a nationally representative 
poll, ordered by Rīga Stradiņš University, in November/December 2019 (percent of the 
respondents).
Figure 3: Willingness to defend Baltic states according to a nationally representative 
poll, ordered by Rīga Stradiņš University, in November/December 2020 (percent of the 
respondents).
According to both polls, the highest level of willingness to defend 
one’s own country was recorded in Estonia, while Latvia came second and 
Lithuania  — third, on both occasions. It is important to mention that the 
second poll was conducted during the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic. For 
this or another reason, the results returned significantly higher number of 
hard-to-say answers. 
Needless to say, results from public surveys have to be approached with 
care and they need a robust interpretation. The same questions can mean 
different things to different people. Also, people’s opinions and positions do 
not necessarily reflect in action. Therefore, authors of each of the following 
country chapters on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will approach these data 
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Willingness to Defend Estonia: 
Fostered by Civil-Military Integration 
and Communication
Dr. Ivo Juurvee (ORCID: 0000-0001-9239-047X), 
International Centre for Defence and Security 
and Estonian Military Academy 
Will to defend one’s own country is of multifold importance in Estonia, 
and it may mean more in legal, practical, and cognitive ways than is 
usual elsewhere. First of all, the article 54 of the Estonian Constitution 
states: “Estonian citizens have a duty to be loyal to the constitutional order 
and to defend the independence of Estonia.”1 Obviously, if the will were 
absent, it would be impossible for the state to enforce this duty on every 
single citizen. 
Secondly, the practical importance of the will to defend is connected to 
the defence system used in Estonia — there is compulsory military service 
for all male citizens that features fighting training. In the case of war these 
reservists would be mobilized in order to bolster existing units and from 
reserve ones. Such a system could not be implemented unless the people 
were willing to go through the military service or to join their units in the 
case of mobilization. Additionally, some defence tasks are carried out by the 
Defence League, a voluntary organization. 
Thirdly, people think that defending one’s own country is important. 
According to public opinion polls, when people were asked to name the 
strongest guarantees of the security of the country, “defence willingness of 
people” was in solid second place, losing only to “membership in NATO”.2 
The same notion has been shared by high-ranking defence officials.3
The popular knowledge shared also by opinion of Estonian press is that 
the will to defend is “high” in the country. Although this notion does not 
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necessarily have to be wrong, it raises some following questions this article 
tries to answer: How the will to defend is defined and measured in Estonia? 
What are the results and dynamics of the results over time? Finally, the 
most sophisticated question: What are the reasons and processes behind 
such results? While first three questions are answerable based on earlier 
literature and public opinion polls, in the case of the last question, 
establishing, not to mention proving, all the causal relationships may prove 
to be overcomplicated. Therefore, in addition to consultation of earlier 
studies, a focus group and more essayistic approach was used.
There are different options for defining will to defend (or in other 
words: will to fight for one’s own country). In Estonian usually the term 
“kaitsetahe” is used, which literally translates to English as “will to defend”. 
Although it is used in various strategy documents, it has not been defined 
there. According to a practitioner researching the issue, the definition best 
applicable for Estonia would be “will of every individual to defend his/her 
country”.4 It can be divided into active (readiness to personally participate 
in armed resistance) and passive (general approval of resistance in the case 
of foreign aggression) willingness to defend.5
Measuring the will to defend in Estonia
The mainstay of measuring the will to defend is the “Public opinion on 
national defence”  — a poll conducted on the order of Ministry of Defence 
for more than 20 years. During the period of 2000—2006 the survey was 
conducted trice a year, since 2007, twice a year. The planned sample has 
always been 1000, the methodology and questions similar and comparable, 
although some alternations and adding more questions has been necessary. 
Reports of the surveys conducted since 2001 are freely available on the 
website of the Ministry of Defence in Estonian, reports since 2012 are also 
available in English.6 In current questionnaires there are 51 questions on 
the subject matter plus 18 questions on background of the respondent.7 In 
addition to the will to defend, a wide set of opinions on security is asked.
The reports contain a comparison of data going back to 2000 and serve 
as a solid basis for both academic and public discussion. However, there are 
some limitations. 
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Firstly, the most obvious limitation is that gathering of data only started 
in 2000. Therefore, research on public opinion on the defence issues during 
the first nine years after regaining Estonia’s independence cannot be 
conducted with the same accuracy as during the later period. There have 
been attempts to overcome the problem by using other data, and, in the case 
of Estonia, these have led researchers to use the European Values Survey 
1990.8 Data gathering for that survey in Estonia was conducted 1  June to 
30  August 1990.9 The approach poses some problems, since at that time 
Estonia was still occupied by Soviet forces and had no military power of 
its own. What did the respondents have in mind while asked of their 
“confidence in armed forces”? It is complicated to figure it out 30 years later 
and even more so to compare it with more recent data. 
Secondly, although the questionnaire is rather long — that also means 
time-consuming for the respondent and resource consuming for the 
customer  — there may always be some more questions of interest for 
academic study. In such cases additional (sometimes ad hoc) surveys are 
conducted, but this cannot be done retrospectively. The largest of them is 
the survey of persons going through their compulsory military service 
that saw light for the first time in 2016.10 Smaller surveys concerning 
different aspects of the will to defend have been executed as a part of 
BA11 or MA12 studies at universities or as a part of higher-level officer 
training.13 
In addition to the polls, there are other indictors of the will to defend. 
Some of them are easily measurable, like the percentage of conscripts 
entering the service as volunteers. Some others are also measurable, but 
the data is not easily available in the public domain, like the percentage of 
reservists showing up for the annual planned or snap military exercises. 
Others may be a bit more indirect, but still showing something. After the 
Russian-speaking pro-Communist hardliners’ coup d’état attempt in Tallinn 
on 15 May 1990, there was an influx of volunteers to the newly formed Home 
Guard and Border Guard, the same way there was an influx of members to 
Defence League and Volunteer Police after riots in Tallinn on 26—27 April 
2007. An even more drastic example may be August 1991, when estimated 
2000 thousand volunteers of Home Guard and Defence League were ready 
to face the additional Soviet troops entering Estonia from the direction of 
Pskov. They had almost no firearms and lacked structure, equipment, and 
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training — one might argue they did not have much except the will to defend. 
Although such events do not show any long-time trends, they probably show 
the heightened will to defend during troubled times for the country. 
Results of the survey “Public opinion on national defence”
The overall dynamics of the will to defend of Estonia’s population are 
probably best demonstrated by the Figure 1.
 
Figure 1: Assessments of the need to provide armed resistance, comparison of 
2000-2020 (percent, n=all respondents) (surveys ordered by the Estonian Ministry of 
Defence).14
In order to understand the numbers, a timeline of security related events 
in Estonia and the region is helpful. The reason for starting the surveys 
was the process of Estonia becoming a NATO member, however, the threat 
picture was not the same as two decades later. By 2000, Russia was not 
aggressive towards the West or Estonia (although maybe cold towards the 
latter) and its military resources were limited, struggling inside its own 
borders in Chechnya, not invading any neighbours. 
Since 2003, Estonian Defence Forces widened their foreign missions 
to Iraq (platoon until 2009) and Afghanistan (in 2006—2014 there was a 
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action and 130 were wounded or injured.15 In 2004, Estonia become a full 
member of NATO. In 2007, pro-Russian riots took place in Tallinn and the 
country faced cyber-attacks from the same source.16 In 2008, Russia invaded 
Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. There were also some positive news 
regarding security — in 2014, NATO air policing fighters arrived to Ämari 
AFB in Estonia to stay and 150 US soldiers were temporarily stationed in 
Estonia. In 2016, the decision was made during NATO summit to position 
Enhanced Forward Presence troops in Estonia, that arrived at Tapa Military 
Base in spring 2017.
Not all of the abovementioned events have had detectable traces on 
Figure 1. Still, some heightened alertness seems to be detectable in 2006—
2007 and 2013—2014, since when the level of the will to defend has remained 
constantly high.
Although the perception of security of Estonians and representatives of 
other nationalities (mainly Russian-speakers) may be different, the number 
of supporters of armed resistance among them do not differ drastically, at 
some point in 2006 and 2013 non-Estonians even surpassing Estonians, 
see Figure 2. Again, the numbers are rather stable since 2014, however, the 
reasons for earlier changes in the public mood remain unknown.
Figure 2: Proportion of supporters of armed resistance, comparison of Estonians and 
non-Estonians, 2006-2020 (percent of respondents considering armed resistance 































































































































The two figures presented above speak of the passive will to defend. The 
survey also monitors the active will to defend. Figure 3 shows the results 
making distinction between ethnic Estonians, Estonian citizens who are 
not ethnic Estonians, and others. As one can notice, the numbers of people 
willing to actively participate are considerably lower than those on the 
previous figure supporting the fighting in principle. In this context, it is 
worth mentioning that according to Estonian legislation only citizens have 
to serve in the armed forces. Therefore, although the non-citizens have some 
will to defend, they are not trained for it.
 
Figure 3: Proportion of residents willing to participate in defence activities in the case 
of an attack, comparison of Estonian and non-Estonian speaking residents, 2000—2020 
(percent of respondents definitely or probably willing to participate, n=all respondents) 
(surveys ordered by the Estonian Ministry of Defence).18
Finally, results with most practical utility from the military perspective, 
according to Estonian legislation, a person liable for national defence 
obligation is “a male person between the ages of 18 and 60 years”.19 Table 1 
shows will to defend of those who are trained and would be expected to 
do so. Although among Estonians the results are higher than among non-
ethnic-Estonians, both seem to be fairly high, although not at the same level 























































































































































































































Men of Estonian nationality with 
Estonian citizenship 74,4 70,6 80,6 79,1 65,9
Men of other nationalities with 
Estonian citizenship* 64,1 61,5 66,7 68,8 50,0
All men with Estonian citizenship 72,8 69,4 78,8 77,3 63,5
Table 1: Proportion of people willing to participate in defence activities in the case of 
attack among men with Estonian citizenship by age and nationality, autumn 2020 (survey 
ordered by the Estonian Ministry of Defence) (percent).20
Although these numbers never have and hopefully never will be tested, 
they seem to be high enough to make mobilised EDF a credible deterrent. 
Possible reasons for survey results
In 1993, the Head of the General Staff [and de facto Chief of Defence] Colonel 
[and later 4-star General] Ants Laaneots was asked by journalist on the 
issue of will in the following wording: “General Laidoner [C-in-C 1934–1940] 
considered the state’s will to defend to be the basis of the state’s defence 
capability. Does Estonia have enough of it now?” Laaneots answered with a 
gloomy face: 
“Today it would be an overstatement to say that people’s will to defend 
is on the appropriate level. The will of Estonian people in years 1938, 1939, 
1940 and later cannot be compared with the one today. This is probably 
the legacy of our slave psychology, which has come due to this 52-year 
occupation, and as this inertia, this mood is passed on. It is still the case 
today that many citizens, both male and female, do not realize that we 
are an independent country and nobody except ourselves is going to 
defend us. Patriotism, a sense of responsibility towards one’s homeland, 
which is especially developed among, say, young men in the Scandinavian 
countries, we have not reached it yet, and it is probably a long process to 
get there.”21
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This quote was used as a starting point for a focus group (FG) of four 
experienced practitioners of the field to discuss the undercurrents of 
Estonia’s will to defend in three last decades, and the following conclusions 
are based on the results of the group.22 It adds considerably to basic timeline 
sketched in previous subchapter.
Besides many socio-economic reasons behind the low will to defend 
in 1990ies, the FG pointed out the low perception of threat based on 
philosophy  — interpretation of Francis Fukuyama’s ideas as the end of 
history with the good winning was popular also in Estonia. Additionally, 
in the criminal turmoil of 1990, some EDF or Defence League members 
attracted the media interest because of criminal activities or consuming 
alcohol while on duty. In 1997, there was a tragedy of 14 soldiers getting 
killed in one accident during peace-time training. The First Chechen War 
staring in 1994 raised the sense of threat only moderately. On the other 
hand, the first positive trends also started in the same decade, like reserve 
officer courses for student lasting for three summers (1996—1998) and 
reserve exercises involving VIP-s. 
The reserve military in general disrupts the borders between the armed 
forces and civilian society — most males go to the military service and later 
return to the society with more knowledge, also the reserve officers spread 
understanding of military affairs among civilians and vice versa. These 
processes are made even smoother by vocational military education in high 
schools. In the same context the Higher Defence Courses must be mentioned, 
organised for opinion leaders and decision makers since 1999.
Popularity of the military has been upgraded by its help to civilians in 
crises. Most publicly known is the deployment of field hospital with military 
personnel to the island of Saaremaa during the hight of Covid-19 crisis in 
Spring 2020, but the military has also participated in saving the plane after 
a crash landing on the ice of Lake Ülemiste next to Tallinn airport in 2010, 
and in other minor cases.
Last not least, the communication efforts of the military have been 
effective. The first large campaigns like “Conscription is an Honour”23 (since 
2000) and “Father defends” (since 2003, jointly with police) started already 
long ago and have changed significantly. 
The importance of history and its popularity after regaining independence 
in the formation of the will to defend should not be underestimated. The War 
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of Independence of 1918—1920 showed, that even Russia is beatable if the 
will is strong. The Soviet-initiated Communist coup d’état attempt in 1924 
showed that there are some dangers even during — seemingly — peace time. 
The silent submission of 1939 left a shadow of shame (although Finland 
managed to remain independent through fighting) and occupations of 1940-
1991 showed what happens to those who do not fight.
A part of the historical heritage is also the volunteer culture, Defence 
League having the most impact. The military is also traditionally involved 
in celebrations of the two most important national holidays, with EDF 
parade on 24 February (Independence Day of 1918) and Defence League 
Parade on 23 June (Victory Day of 1919). The survival of historical heritage 
has been supported by cinema productions and TV series, to a lesser extent 
by literature. The film “Names in Marble”24 (2002), based on 1936 novel 
depicting the battle route of volunteer schoolboys battalion during the War of 
Independence breaking battles of January 1919, has had the highest impact.
Historical memory is also preserved by war memorials all over the 
country and the museums, such as the Estonian War Museum in Tallinn 
and the Permanent Exhibition of the Patriotic Education in Valga.
Conclusions
The will to defend is a complex phenomenon. For Estonia it has a high 
practical meaning, making its reserve military operational and deterrence 
credible. Luckily for Estonia this phenomenon is rather precisely and 
frequently measured for already more than two decades. The current 
numbers  — last poll available during preparation of this article is from 
September 2020 — are encouraging. However, there are still some problems 
remaining, like the gap in the will to defend between ethnic Estonians and 
their other compatriots. 
The blank spot in the knowledge on the will to defend are the 1990ies. 
Since frequent polls with sound methodology were not conducted at the 
time, it would be a complex task to provide any final conclusions on that 
period.
The reasons behind the relatively high will to defend are more debatable. 
In addition to the events in the field of security and the overall threat picture, 
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the experts in the focus group also saw the importance of the integration 
of military and civilian sector caused by the reserve military system and 
overall conscription, the visibility of NATO, education in high schools and 
among opinion leaders, military public affairs activities and, last but not 
least — historical heritage.
Compared to Latvia and Lithuania, the will to defend seems to be higher in 
Estonia according to available data. There is no single and easily identifiable 
reason behind these differences. On one hand, explaining everything with 
differences in national psyche would be short-sighted and far from academic 
approach. On the other hand, the security concerns of the three countries 
are similar and have been so for already a century. These countries are 
similar in many other respects as well, although Estonia’s nominal per 
capita GDP is slightly higher, considering some other measurable factors 
the countries have rather similar scores and ranking in the United Nations 
Human Development Index — Estonia ranks 29, Lithuania 34 and Latvia 37 
among 189 countries.25 
The only obvious difference between the countries is in the military 
system. Latvia abolished conscription in 2007, Lithuania in the period 
between 2008 and 2015, while in Estonia conscription has been constant. 
This has had positive influence on the will to defend inside the Estonian 
society. There may also be some geographical reasons, like Estonia being 
more influenced by Nordic Countries, especially Finland where the will to 
defend has traditionally been high.26 It is possible that the communication 
of defence issues has been more successful in Estonia, or maybe some 
historical reasons contribute to the data. Probably only a detailed survey 
of different aspects on the will to defend simultaneously and with the same 
methodology in all three countries could provide a clearer understanding.
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There is a significant number of existing polling and research on willingness 
of the Latvian population to defend its own country. The polling done for 
this research does not demonstrate significant deviations from the classical 
trends. The Latvian population traditionally has been prone to support 
its country against external enmities after regaining independence. The 
country of Latvia is being held dear, while criticism of the ruling political 
parties, politicians, the overall development of the state of Latvia has been 
high with clear signs of disappointment. Complicated relationships with 
neighbouring countries, in particular the Russian Federation, also increase 
the equivocal outlook among the Latvian population. 
This chapter will deal with the trends in willingness of the population 
of the country to defend Latvia. It will provide three central explanations 
of what has been influencing and shaping the attitudes of the Latvian 
population and what is influencing them now. The three aspects to reckon 
with are: the attitudes towards Latvia’s political and economic development 
over the last thirty years; the relationship with the Russian Federation 
(and Belarus); and the psychological and physical factors required for 
active actual defence. The chapter will argue that there is a significant 
disappointment and confusion among the Latvian population that prevents 
it from being stronger supporters of defending Latvia. The chapter will build 
on the polling data gathered for this research to demonstrate tendencies and 
make conclusions. 
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Attitudes towards Latvia’s political and economic 
development
Since Latvia regained independence, the willingness to defend the country 
among the Latvian population has had the tendency to decrease. The 
momentum of regaining independence, popular resistance against the 
Soviet Union and hopes for brighter future in the re-established nation 
state influenced the spirit of people. The uplifting feelings associated 
with the new state after the Soviet Union collapsed were visible through 
the Latvian society. Defending the state against external enemies was 
especially outspoken among the Latvian speaking part of the population. 
Poverty and living standard discrepancies between the Soviet Union and 
Western countries raised hopes for rapidly improving life as Latvia would 
tilt towards the West. 
The political, economic, and social transformation of the 1990s did not 
result in increased welfare for the masses. This together with continuous 
political scandals facilitated disappointment among the Latvian population. 
Lengthy inability to improve the living standards for most of the population 
in combination with widespread corruption, criminality, highly negative 
opinions in mass media, with lack of perspective on individual level can 
be regarded as reasons for disappointment and consequently — decreasing 
patriotism and willingness to defend the country. Disappointment in the 
state and its political leadership, and country’s slow economic development 
continued throughout the 2000s and into 2010s, especially when in the 
2008-2009 economic crisis hit Latvia hard. As the Figure 1 of the chapter 
“Willingness to Defend the Baltic States in Quantitative Terms” research 
demonstrates, the willingness to defend Latvia has been gradually 
falling and in early 2010s reached the record lows of approximately 30 to 
40  percent of the ones who are ready. The original disappointment about 
Latvia’s post-Soviet economic and political development in the 1990s was 
gradually substituted with growing disillusionment after Latvia was struck 
by economic and financial crisis in 2008.
Data demonstrate that despite post-crisis economic development and 
worsening of the geopolitical situation in the region, the willingness to 
defend the country has not been rapidly increasing. In 2014, when the 
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Ukrainian crisis emerged, the numbers of willingness to defend did 
increase, but the overall tendency of willingness to defend has kept falling 
instead. To explain the trend and the current situation with 2020 data, two 
factors must be analysed separately: economic disappointment and political 
disillusionment. The economic disappointment is related to the means and 
options that are available to most of the Latvian population both objectively 
and subjectively. The political disillusionment is tied to losing interest in 
political participation and sense of belonging to the nation state. 
Economic disappointment is tied to the fact that despite being part of 
the European Union, the Eurozone, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and many other multilateral economic 
organisations and institutions Latvia’s socio-economic situation is still worse 
than that of the most other European Union member states. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita of Latvia is not only at the levels of 69 percent of the 
EU average,1 but it is lower than that of the closest partners and historical 
friends Estonia and Lithuania. In reality, Latvia is the poorest country in 
the Baltic Sea region, besides Belarus and the Russian Federation. The fact 
that Latvia for 30 years already has been less developed economically in 
comparison to its closest neighbours does not facilitate the populations’ 
willingness to defend the country. 
Inequality levels in Latvia are significant, with GINI index still reaching 
35.1 in 2018,2 which does not help to improve the people’s trust and support 
for the country or its society. Risk of poverty and social exclusion is high 
in Latvia, with 26 percent of population being subjected to risk of poverty. 
Although the number has been steadily decreasing over the years, the 
absolute number of poor people in 2019 was almost half a million.3 This is a 
sour situation if one takes into account that people with a sense of economic 
safety in their country are the backbone of those willing to defend the 
state by any means against any foreign enemy. Those who have material 
possessions, especially real estate property and lifestyle that they could lose 
in case of foreign attack and change of the government, are more willing to 
defend the status quo, including their own country.
Economic disappointment over three decades has become embedded 
in some parts of the Latvian state. In particular, in Eastern regions with 
continuously high structural unemployment rates, lack of perspective and 
an unbreakable poverty cycle over generations.4 Low levels of accumulated 
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personal capital and economic perspectives lead to decreased willingness 
to defend the state. Sense of belonging and economic welfare cannot be 
separated. Willingness to defend the political system which has brought 
hardships and has not alleviated socio-economic burdens does not stimulate 
individual or popular support.
And this is tied to the second aspect  — the political disillusionment 
among the Latvian population. Political disillusionment is a result of several 
factors. Most important of which is the continuous lack of strong nationwide 
political narrative. Latvia is a multi-ethnic society with freedom of religion 
and all the traditional civil liberties guaranteed to most of the population. 
Meanwhile, not only the ethnical, religious, cultural disunity has limited 
the development of a strong dominating yet inclusive narrative. It is also 
the long-term challenges with exclusion of certain parts of the population 
from the political process. Moreover, the complexity of the country’s history, 
especially that of the World War II and the Soviet occupation, and decades-
long debates on historical memories did not result in generating one single, 
unifying message that would be acceptable to the majority of the population. 
Due to the communist experiences, the post-Soviet transition, the 
EU accession and the constantly evolving political, social, cultural, and 
economic value system, the Latvian society is often confused and lacks 
a clear national narrative that would serve as the basis for patriotism in 
Latvia beyond the Latvian ethnical group. Attempts to build a national 
narrative are also traditionally tied to Latvia’s past and history, neglecting 
modern day achievements and success stories. Such attempts at a national 
narrative ignore the natural diversity of every society and seek to exclude a 
wide range of smaller and bigger groups from the economic, social, legal, or 
political process. This exclusion over the past thirty years has diminished 
or prevented increasing the willingness especially of the ethnic non-Latvian 
population, i.e., predominantly Russian speakers, to defend the country. 
Ethnic non-Latvian population traditionally demonstrates low levels of 
readiness to defend the country. 
Yet, it is not only the lack of an overarching and inclusive national 
narrative that would fit the socio-economic and culturally linguistic realities 
of modern Latvia. It is also about the political disillusionment stemming 
from the democratic political party system and its actors’ behaviour. The 
political scene of Latvia for thirty years has been dominated by a high 
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turnover of political parties. The political parties tend to not only adjust their 
names frequently, but also change their leadership, political positions, and 
allegiances. A visible and confusing problem for voters is the regular birth 
of new parties and their alliances before every elections and fundamental 
transformation of existing political parties even while they are represented 
in the parliament. Both eligible voters and general population tends to follow 
and support individual candidates and their failure to gain power or fulfil 
promises is seen with disappointment. 
In addition — a large number of corruption scandals, as well as constantly 
high corruption perception in the country shows that the population 
distrusts the decision makers. Corruption scandals ranging from state 
capture to oligarchy and petty corruption have been a constant presence 
in the country. In addition to mismanagement of state funds, fraud cases, 
as well as inefficient public procurement procedures both on national level 
and municipal level, increases distrust in politicians and both elected and 
appointed officials. This has led to political disillusionment that is also 
clearly visible via the great number of protest voters at every election. 
A high number of people choosing to stay out of the political process, 
including elections, is also alarming and demonstrates that people do not 
see themselves as stakeholders in Latvia’s political process, affecting also 
the willingness to defend the country. 
Lastly, political disillusionment and economic disappointment is 
attributable to the low overall media-literacy level,5 as well as the limited 
understanding of democratic political process and free market economics 
among the general population. Too many people see themselves as being 
constantly played by the state, the decision makers, the entrepreneurs 
and the economic system itself. An abundance of political positions, media 
sources, as well as people-to-people connections within the country and 
with neighbouring countries have also an effect on willingness to defend 
Latvia. 
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Relationships with the Russian Federation (and Belarus)
The relationship with Russia and Belarus is a significant aspect to fully 
understand the willingness of the population to defend Latvia. Both 
neighbouring countries exercise significant presence not only in Latvia’s 
foreign and security policy, but also in Latvia’s media space and society’s 
mental space. Due to the Soviet past, there is a significant familiarity on 
the political, economic, and people-to-people levels. Diplomatic relations and 
economic cooperation between countries have been worsening over the past 
decade and currently have reached the level where Russia officially is seen 
as the main security threat of Latvia.6 Recently, also relations with Belarus 
have reached lows after the post-2020 election crisis. Meanwhile, for a 
significant number of Latvia’s inhabitants, personal family and friendship 
connections with Belarus and Russia play a substantial role in perceiving or 
not perceiving either of these countries as a potential threat. 
The case of defending Latvia against military threats from Russia is 
complex to explain. There is a greater number of factors that need to be 
considered. The first is that the number of ethnic Russians in Latvia is 
more than a quarter of population — more than 520 thousand. Out of those 
a little short of 137 thousand are non-citizens of the Republic of Latvia.7 
The same logic and principles apply in the case of established long-term 
family, friendship, and business relations. Familiarity with people from the 
Russian Federation influences the way how the Latvian society, regardless 
of ethnicity, perceives the possible threats from the big neighbour. 
Russian influence on the minds and hearts of the Latvian population is 
also actively exercised via Russian mass media, including entertainment 
programs. Due to widespread Russian language skills among the Latvian 
population and wide accessibility of programs originating from the Russian 
Federation, Russia may not be seen as aggressor or even a threat neither 
to Latvia, nor to the Western world in general. Russia may be perceived 
as misunderstood by the West and just exercising its legitimate national 
security interests. Such a perception is especially outspoken among the 
ethnically Russian population.
Belarus, on the other hand, has not been seen as an immediate security 
threat. Despite differences in geopolitical approaches and differences in 
political regimes, both countries have had constructive and improving 
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economic relations, regular political consultations and even moments of 
friendly relations. In the minds of many Latvian people, Belarus was seen not 
only as a friendly country, but even as an example of a successfully governed 
state. The Latvian society has not learned to perceive Belarus as a potential 
security threat and defending against it is not seen as a concern. Even 
now, with Belarus openly leading hybrid warfare against Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland, the population is not strongly positioned towards Belarus as a 
military security threat. Belarus like Russia should be considered from the 
point of view of active people-to-people relations. Common border regions 
and common economic projects are just the first examples. One should not 
forget almost 64 thousand ethnic Belarusians living in Latvia in 2021.8 
Approximately 28 000 of those are citizens of the Republic of Latvia and 
approximately the same number are non-citizens of the Republic of Latvia.9 
Among many other things, the high number of ethnically mixed 
marriages in Latvia contribute to the mutual understanding and decreasing 
willingness to defend the country against potential Russian (and Belarusian) 
invasion. The positive attitudes, predominantly among a significant part 
of Russian speakers in Latvia, towards Russia and its aggressive policies 
domestically and abroad are facilitated not only by the official channels 
but also by misinformation campaigns online. Very often people acquire 
their information about political processes from entertainment materials 
unrelated to news or credible information agencies. In combination with the 
distrust towards the national government and belief that “everyone lies”, 
the Latvian population tends not to accept the neighbouring countries as an 
actual threat and their populations as enemies. 
People don’t want to accept that things they like could be wrong. And 
the same thing applies to Russia (and to reasonable extend Belarus) as the 
most immediate threats that Latvia would need to be defended against. Low 
readiness to defend the country is also tied to the fact that Latvia is part 
of the European Union and NATO. This situation facilitates understanding 
and belief that war is not imminent. Threats from China, North Korea or 
Middle Eastern countries like Iran are too distant for the Latvian population, 
therefore they do not cause a sense of anxiety and necessity to be prepared 
for actual warfare. The geopolitical situation in the region over the past thirty 
years has influenced the threat perception and the psychology of the Latvian 
population and consequently their willingness to defend the country. 
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Psychological and physical factors 
Individual’s readiness to defend his or her country is an actual rational 
calculation based on arguments, fears, preferences, and mental pre-
disposition. It is a complex structure of concerns, embedded beliefs and 
expected practical outcomes from action or inaction. Each individual in 
Latvia forms their position towards war and defence of their own country 
based on their own personal experiences with military and defence 
structures and products, including warfare itself.
Peoples’ personal experiences with war may be an aspect influencing 
one’s readiness to defend the country with military means. Highest numbers 
of people willing to defend Latvia were registered during the national 
movement that emerged during the protests among others against the war 
in Afghanistan. With many young people having personal experience with 
warfare and being part of the two-year mandatory military service in the 
Soviet army, the attitude towards the possibility of war and individual’s 
participation in it was much more acceptable than nowadays. Several 
aspects are influencing this. 
The first aspect is that more than one generation has grown up in 
Latvia without personal experiences of war and armed conflicts. In 
combination with video materials and real time stories available via news 
channels, documentaries, and even social media, people are acquiring a 
distaste towards engaging in a modern-day warfare. Unwillingness to be 
killed or severely crippled “as seen on TV”, influences the way people are 
psychologically ready to defend10 Latvia. 
The abolishing of conscription in Latvia in 2007 has also had a direct 
effect on people’s readiness to defend their country via military means. 
People may see warfare as something very distant. They may see the war 
and defence as the responsibility solely of the professional army and not 
them personally. Additionally, a significant number of people in Latvia due 
to options to avoid military service when enrolment was still compulsory and 
because of the introduction of voluntary military enlistment have no practical 
experience with weapons, with military structures, with military equipment 
and modern war. Because of lack of military training, physical preparation 
and theoretical skills of warfare, the general population is ignorant towards 
war and does not think of itself as capable of surviving any armed conflict. 
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Even the basic information on military infrastructure in the country or 
behaviour during a military conflict is unknown to most of the people in 
Latvia. With this emotional feeling of helplessness, Latvian population may 
be more prepared to physically leave the country rather than defend it. 
Due to the aforementioned distrust in their own skills and physical 
abilities, people may tend to choose not to believe in a possibility of an 
armed conflict emerging where they could be asked to defend their country. 
Population will choose to believe that war is impossible rather than prepare 
themselves. Due to the inability to understand their role and place in the 
country in case of a military attack, individuals may choose to hope for the 
situation to never arrive instead of actively preparing themselves and their 
communities. 
Finally, it is about the communities  — friends, family, co-workers, and 
their willingness to defend the country. Defensive military actions are a 
mass event. The positioning and attitudes of the closest friends and Allies, 
as well as mass psychology is essential in convincing people to take action 
or to abstain from it. Lack of alternatives and threats to life, health, living 
standard, property and family are the reasons why people may opt for 
weapons. In case of missing immediate and unavoidable pressures, the 
choice may be alternatives to defending the country. Same is with the peer-
pressure — with existing peer-pressure people will chose to act one way or 
another. They may also choose to promise doing one thing or the other. This 
only means, that peacetime polling on people’s willingness to defend the 
country may not accurately present their actual readiness. 
Conclusions
The question if people are willing to defend Latvia is a complex one, that 
requires complex answers. The decreasing percentage of the population that 
is ready to defend the country can be explained by the overall development 
in and of Latvia within the past thirty years. The country has managed to 
achieve geopolitical and geo-economic stability and does not face immediate 
threats even from its most worrisome neighbours, especially Russia. Current 
low levels of readiness to defend Latvia that the population demonstrates 
should be considered as a natural outcome of the situation that the Latvian 
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society has been living in. The readiness level to defend Latvia among the 
Latvian population is only around thirty percent due to several reasons: 
NATO membership and Euro-Atlantic partnerships as safety guarantees, 
biased views on Russia (and Belarus), low levels of skills and knowledge 
of how to act in case of military conflict, low levels of trust in the political 
system and political disillusionment, as well as high levels of economic 
disappointment within the Latvian society. 
Too many Latvian people do not feel like they are shareholders in their 
own country. They do not see the country worth defending. And they don’t 
see why they should be defending it against Russia, Belarus, or any other 
country. Hence, the country should think about its patriotism level and 
the possibility of deepening the bond with citizens via public diplomacy 
instruments such as open activities and public events. A good example is 
the “Latvian Song and Dance Festival”, where individuals feel a sense of 
belonging to the country and share common values. That kind of impact 
on society could contribute to the growth of the patriotism level and the 
willingness to defend.
One of the core problems are that individuals don’t know how to defend 
not only the country, but even themselves. Defence of the country has 
become something distant and most likely would be met with widespread 
panic and mass exodus. Consequently, engaging more people, both young 
and older, in military training, including via theoretical and informative 
programs on television and internet that the population can access at 
any time, would be a major step towards raising people’s awareness and, 
accordingly — the willingness to defend Latvia. 
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Willingness to Defend Lithuania: 
“System Problem Detected,  
Action Pending”
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General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania
After joining NATO, Lithuania mobilized all its military capabilities to 
become a responsible partner of the Alliance, primarily by participating in 
expeditionary missions. The annexation of Crimea inspired the return of 
Lithuania’s security and defence policy to territorial defence. Conventional 
capacity building and tactics to combat hybrid threats have become key 
challenges for the national defence system. The first task was to find ways to 
increase Lithuania’s quantitative advantage over a potential aggressor, i.e., 
to strengthen deterrence by denial. Compulsory permanent initial military 
service was used to create an army reserve. In this context, the question 
arose as to whether the duty to the homeland should be performed out of love 
for it or simply because it is mandated. In fact, one of the direct expressions 
of love for the homeland may be willingness to defend one’s own country.
According to a 2019 representative public survey1, only 4.2 percent 
of the respondents strongly agreed that in the case of an armed attack 
Lithuania’s inhabitants should defend themselves and the state. In 2020, 
the number of respondents with this attitude rose to 8.4 percent. Even 
before the Covid-2019 pandemic, the reluctance of Lithuania’s inhabitants 
to express willingness to defend the state was the strongest of all the Baltic 
states, comparing the survey data of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 2019 
and 2020. Unlike in the case of Estonia,2 annual representative surveys 
using the same questionary to assess the willingness to defend one’s own 
country are not conducted in Lithuania. Consequently, it becomes difficult 
to draw general conclusions about the dynamics of the willingness to defend 
Lithuania. The most important problem encountered in analysing the results 
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of different surveys is not only that the wording of the question differs, but 
also that the surveys do not reveal the motives of those who do not want to 
contribute to Lithuania’s defence. The first part of the chapter is intended to 
discuss how willingness to defend one’s own state is measured in Lithuania. 
In the second part, the will to defend one’s state using a weapon is linked 
to the readiness to do so. It is assumed that in the case of armed resistance, 
the will alone is not enough, and skills are necessary to strengthen the will. 
The third part aims to briefly discuss the possible reasons why Lithuanians 
may lack the will to defend their state. What is not discussed in this chapter 
is no less important. How does belief in the capabilities of the military affect 
the will of the people to resist and the will to defend the state? How do public 
discourses about “small Lithuania” and “big hostile Russia” affect people’s 
belief that defending the country is not a case lost before it even began due 
to the asymmetry in military capabilities? And, most importantly, what will 
predict how the willingness to defend one’s state could become a real action? 
Since respondents are asked a hypothetical question whether they would 
defend the state, they provide a hypothetical answer. 
Who is willing to defend Lithuania?
In fact, the willingness of Lithuanians to defend their homeland is not a 
frequent object of sociological surveys. The Civil Society Institute “Civitas” 
(CSI) has been conducting a survey of the Civic empowerment index in 
Lithuania since 2007. After the annexation of Crimea, in 2014 and 2015 
the institute included a question in its annual surveys: “Of course, we all 
hope that there will be no more war, but if it would, would you defend your 
country?” To measure a change of the willingness to defend one’s country, 
the institute included data from the European Social Survey (ESS) (Table 1). 
According to the Civic power index of 2014 and 2015, the willingness to 
defend one’s country is related to one’s active participation in civil and 
political activities, inclination to contribute to solutions of various social 
problems, and belief that citizens have influence in society.3
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Of course, we all hope that there will be 












Yes 61 46 32 56,7 56
No 12 18 41 14,5 17
Don’t know 27 37 27 28,9 27
Table 1. Willingness to defend Lithuania according to polls included in the Civic 
empowerment index by the Civil Society Institute (Lithuania) (percent).4
In 2017, the results of the research project “Subjective Security in 
a Changing Geopolitical Context: Peculiarities, Forming Factors, and 
Strategies Developed by Individuals” were published. According to the 
survey included in the project, in 2016, only 49 percent of respondents were 
willing to defend Lithuania, while 34 percent of the respondents were not. 
The study showed that young men with military experience were more 
willing to defend their homeland. The authors of the study also made the 
assumption that pride in one’s state and patriotic attitudes may influence 
the will to defend Lithuania in the event of military aggression. The survey 
showed that 39 percent of the respondents were proud to be citizens of 
Lithuania and would go to defend their homeland in the event of war; 20 
percent of the respondents were not proud to be Lithuanians, but willing 
to defend their homeland, while 17 percent were proud, but not willing 
to defend one’s country due to their age, health status or other reasons. 
It is also necessary to mention that the results of the study indicate that 
patriotism is linked to specific actions in the event of war, i.e., less patriotic 
individuals in the case of war indicated a desire to emigrate, while patriotic-
minded individuals stated that they would seek to actively contribute to the 
country’s defence.5
In 2018 and 2020, a Sociological Survey of Media Preferences, Geopolitical 
Situation Assessment and Attitudes towards Threats was commissioned by 
the Ministry of National Defence and the Eastern Europe Studies Centre 
(EESC). The survey was based on the same assumption — pride in one’s state 
and patriotic attitudes may influence the willingness to defend one’s state. 
However, the report on the conducted survey includes just one illustrated 
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example, that the respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the 
statement: “Unable to resist with weapon, I would contribute to the defence 
of the country in other way” (Table 2). For some reason the willingness of 
the respondents to contribute to the defence of homeland with a weapon 
was mentioned as if by the way without providing clear data with figures: 
“32% of the respondents said they would contribute to the country’s defence 
with a weapon if needed: compared to 2018, the change in these numbers 
were not statistically significant”6. Meanwhile, in 2018, only 24 percent of 
the respondents were inclined to contribute to armed resistance in case 
of war.7 Whether the population’s higher level of willingness to engage in 
peaceful civic resistance is related to personal attitudes or simply to a lack 
of knowledge on how to use a weapon remains open.
Year Statement Totally agree










Proud to be 
citizens of 
Lithuania




would resist in 
another way 
18 30 19 13 14 6
2020
Proud to be 
citizens of 
Lithuania




would resist in 
another way 
21 37 17 8 14 3
Table 2. Comparison of being proud in Lithuanian citizenship and willingness to 
participate in civic resistance in 2018 and 2020 (surveys ordered by the ministry of 
National Defence and the Eastern Europe Studies Centre (Lithuania)) (percent).8
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The most comprehensive study of the willingness to defend the homeland 
titled “Who would go to defend Lithuania? Assumptions and possibilities of 
civic resistance” was published in 2018. According to the results of a public 
survey conducted in 2017, 42.2 percent answered positively to the question 
“Of course, we all hope that there will be no more war, but if it arises, 
would you personally contribute to Lithuania’s defence?” 25.2 percent of the 
respondents did not express the will to defend the homeland, and 29.9 said 
they did not know. 3 percent of the respondents indicated that they would take 
the initiative to organize the resistance and 36 percent of the respondents 
would contribute to it, although as many as 32 percent would not contribute, 
and 29 percent did not know how they would behave in the case of armed 
attack.9 A lack of knowledge and skills can lead people to declare they do not 
know whether they will defend their homeland in the event of war. One thing 
is to have a particular set of skills and decide not to use it, another thing is to 
actually have no clue what to do in case of military attack.
Since 2018, the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania commissions 
public surveys to assess public trust in the army and willingness to defend 
the homeland.10 The results of the survey are included in the Annual Activity 
Reports of the Ministry. According to the surveys, in 2018, 47 percent of the 
respondents were willing to defend one’s homeland, while 34 percent were 
unwilling, and 19 percent were undecided. The number of the willing to 
defend Lithuania is slowly increasing (48.5 percent in 2019 and 49 percent 
in 2020).11 The goal in 2021 is to reach 52 percent of the citizens willing 
to defend the homeland. As in 2018, the Minister of National Defence 
Raimundas Karoblis stated: “A strong army is unimaginable without public 
support. Growing public support for the Armed Forces and determination 
to protect the Homeland if it is threatened is directly related to the ongoing 
modernization of the Armed Forces and the growing public awareness of 
emerging threats and the information impact of hostile forces.”12 The Annual 
Reports include just a percentage share of Lithuania’s citizens willing to 
defend the country, whereas data on unwilling or ignorant citizens are not 
provided. Thus, there is no possibility to determine whether the number of 
those who are not willing to defend their state is decreasing or increasing. It 
also remains unclear what proportion of the population would contribute to 
peaceful resistance and how many would be willing and able to contribute 
to armed resistance.
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Who is ready to defend Lithuania?
Article 139 of Lithuania’s constitution defines that “The defence of the State 
of Lithuania against a foreign armed attack shall be the right and duty of 
each citizen of the Republic of Lithuania. The citizens of the Republic of 
Lithuania must perform military or alternative national defence service 
according to the procedure established by law.”13 The duty to defend was 
defined by two basic forms: an initial period of mandatory military service 
(12 months duration) and alternative national defence service. Alternative 
types of service included Leadership courses, basic military training 
programme, studies at the Military Academy of Lithuania, and volunteer 
service in the national defence volunteer forces.14 
In 2008, the Lithuanian government decided to change the mixed army 
recruitment model to a professional army, even though conscripts made up 
about 75 percent of the battalions’ contingent at that time. Accordingly, the 
abolition of compulsory initial military service had far-reaching negative 
consequences, i.e., when Russia annexed Crimea, the full staffing of 
different units in Lithuania ranged from 18 to 72 percent.15 Thus, in 2015, 
it was decided to return the conscription duty (nine months of mandatory 
service) as a matter of urgency. The decision had two main objectives: to 
fill army units and to prepare a reserve.16 At first, the conscription age was 
19—26 years, however, in 2019, the draftees age group was changed to 
18—23 years. 
When the Lithuanian Parliament urgently decided in 2015 to return to the 
conscript model, which was abandoned in 2008, the slogan began to spread 
among young people: “Everyone has the right to not kill.”17 This illustrates 
that a country’s defence may have two connotations. The first is that people 
are not willing to contribute to the defence of the country because they want 
to stay alive (desire to survive). The second is that they don’t want to defend 
the state because they don’t want to take the life of another. 
A photo project “They Won the Lottery” was soon presented to the public. 
Fourteen portraits of crying men and their insights into masculinity and 
conscript army18 in Lithuania received condemnation in the public space 
for the reluctance of young men to perform their duties to the homeland. 
Some influential people called the photo project an “insightful, ideological, 
intellectual, attractive and extremely beautiful betrayal of the state.”19 In 
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response to the project, members of the Estonian National Defence League, a 
voluntary national defence organization, presented a photo project “Without 
Tears”, which sought to demonstrate that people living in the small Baltic 
states need to protect their “beloved freedom”20. Nevertheless, according to 
the public opinion poll, 68 percent of the respondents supported the return 
of the conscript army, and only 26 percent of the respondents opposed the 
decision.21 Moreover, in 2016, 81 percent of the respondents believed that 
mandatory military service is beneficial for young people, 12 percent of the 
respondents indicated the opposite.22
In 2015, 36825 draftees were selected by a random electronic selection 
system, i.e., won the lottery. Of these, 3000 were scheduled to be called up 
for service that year (Table 3). Draftees could choose:
1. to perform the service voluntarily, although they were not included in 
the lists of conscripts of that year (conscripts volunteers);
2. to perform the service without requesting a postponement of the 
service time (conscripts in order of priority).
 Category 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Planned number of conscripts 3000 3000 3537 3827 3827 3828
Voluntary requests (have not 
been included in the list of 
conscripts for a calendar year 
and who have expressed a 
wish to perform the service)
2859 3085 2914 2963 2749 2725
Share of all requests for 
compulsory military service 
received that year
71% 63% 50% 42% 40% 39%
Priority requests (draftees on 
the list of conscripts for a cal-
endar year who have expressed 
a wish to perform the service)
1170 1789 2865 4113 4084 4245
Share of all requests for 
compulsory military service 
received that year 
29% 37% 50% 58% 60% 61%
Table 3. Assessment of conscripts’ request to serve in the Lithuanian Armed Forces in 
2015—2020.23 
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3010 soldiers started permanent mandatory initial military service for 
nine months, of which 2133 young people were volunteers and 877 were 
conscripts who expressed a desire to serve in order of priority.24 
According to statistical data provided by the National Military 
Conscription and Recruitment Service, the nature of requests for compulsory 
military service began to change (Figure 1). The share of the draftees that 
were on the list of conscripts for the calendar year and expressed their will 
to be conscripted on the priority basis has increased from 29 percent in 2015 
up to 61 percent in 2020. This indicates that in many cases young people 
are not unwilling to perform compulsory service, but rather they want to 
anticipate and plan it.
Figure 1. Dynamics of conscripts serving in the Lithuanian Armed Forces in 2015—2020.25
Motivation for compulsory military service is supported by paying 
allowances to soldiers. Not only each soldier is being paid 148 Eur monthly to 
cover household expenses, but also solders are getting cumulative payment 
after the service period based upon the military service performance level 
(Table 4). The payment for a volunteer soldier is increased by 30 percent and 
for a soldier who has been called up for service and expressed a desire to be 







2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Volunteers (conscripts who have not been included in the list of conscripts for a calendar year and who have 
expressed a wish to perform the service)
Priority (conscripts on the list of conscripts for a calendar year who have expressed a wish to perform the service)
Mandatory (conscripts on the list of conscripts for a calendar year who are called up for mandatory service)
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Evaluation of service 
performance Compulsorily called On priority basis Volunteer
Excellent 160 184 208
Good 120 138 156
Satisfactory 80 92 104
Table 4. Allowances paid (EUR) to solders based on their service performance level.26 
The conscription allowance system was designed not only to increase 
young people’s motivation to perform mandatory military service, but also 
to compensate for possible financial losses they experience when they leave 
the labour market. However, the continuing desire to perform the military 
service on voluntary or on priority basis cannot be explained by financial 
incentives alone. 
In fact, it is necessary to mention that the analysis of young people’s 
motivation to perform permanent compulsory primary military service in 
2016 and 2017 shows that up to 63 percent of those who wanted to perform 
the service stated that they would serve even without reward. Based on the 
results of the study, it can be argued that the main reason for wanting to 
serve is to learn to protect one’s family and homeland. Also, two important 
stimuli can be identified: the real potential of the threat of attack and 
previous experience in military organizations. Thus, at the beginning of 
service, 81 percent of conscripts were willing to defend the homeland in the 
case of armed attack, while at the end of service the number of those willing 
to defend Lithuania with a weapon decreased to 71 percent.27 Such annual 
conscript surveys should help to identify the reasons for the decline in the 
will to defend one’s country.
Volunteers form a significant part of the Lithuanian Armed Forces 
(Table 5). Although serving in the National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF) 
is an alternative form to mandatory military service, the decision of most 
volunteers is based on patriotic or lifestyle motives. 
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Category 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Professionals 8146 8660 9400 10173 10729 11168 11428










211 211 209 210 217 263 295
Total 15945 16506 18019 19062 19783 20073 20711
Table 5. Lithuania’s national defence system’s personnel size (2015—2021).28
* Planned.
According to the complex sociological research study “Motivation to 
Serve in the Lithuanian army”, published in 2015, 81 percent of the volunteer 
soldiers stated that they joined the NDVF because they wanted to defend 
their homeland in the case of a threat and were driven by patriotic feelings. 
Additionally, 94 percent of the soldiers stated they wanted to experience 
adventure and challenges, while 72 percent indicated that they wanted to 
spend their free time in a worthwhile way. However, only 64 percent of the 
volunteers were certain that they would go to war to defend Lithuania and 
28 percent indicated that they would probably go to war, while 8 percent 
were undecided or stated that they would not defend their own country. The 
latter were younger and had less experience, so some of them were simply 
not convinced they had enough training and skills.29 Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to determine whether the reasons for serving in the NDVF have 
changed during the last six years, as continuous sociological research on 
this topic is not being conducted.
Other factual evidence of increasing citizens’ willingness to participate 
in national defence is the activities of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union. 
According to the Law of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, the Union is a 
voluntary, self-governing civil society organization that strengthens the 
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state’s defence capabilities and develops defence educational activities. 
Although the Union’s main objective is to prepare for non-violent civil 
resistance and armed national defence, it also promotes trust in national 
institutions and public spirit. In case of war the Riflemen’s combat units 
shall carry out the defence tasks assigned by the command of Lithuania’s 
armed forces.30 Before the Russia—Ukraine war, the Union united about 
7,000  members, and since 2015, the number of members has exceeded 
10,000 (Table 6).
Category 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Riflemen 3834 4443 4514 4645 5277 5116
Young Riflemen (age 11—18) 5426 6314 5910 5880 5910 5021
Total 9260 10757 10424 10525 11187 10137
Table 6. Dynamics of change of members of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union in  
2015—2020 according to the Union’s annual reports.31
The union experienced its hour of glory in 2014, when the country’s 
political leaders began to recognize the importance of the Riflemen in 
increasing the state’s defence capabilities.32 In the context of Russia’s 
aggression against Ukraine, in 2014 alone, more than 800 volunteers joined 
the union, including many famous and popular people. The call to “become 
a rifleman to defend the homeland” was effective. It must be borne in mind 
that this effect may have been temporary, i.e., caused by a sense of threat and 
mobilization of patriotism due to the annexation of Crimea. For the effect to 
be lasting, it is necessary to identify the reasons for one’s unwillingness to 
participate in the defence of the state. 
Why wouldn’t someone defend Lithuania?
If we were to evaluate the results of the different national public opinion 
polls discussed in this chapter, we would have to admit that, in the event of 
war, Lithuanian citizens would be the least willing of all the Baltic states 
to defend their country. Moreover, as the questions in these surveys differ, 
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with some placing more emphasis on armed defence and others simply on 
defence, it is difficult to say that respondents would defend Lithuania using 
weapons rather than by resisting peacefully.
The theoretical framework of willingness to defend one’s country is 
based on a couple of assumptions.33 In the case of Lithuania, compulsory 
military service did not have a decisive effect, as the vast majority of 
conscripts choose to perform their service voluntarily or in order of priority. 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, most of the society supports compulsory 
military service and even sees it as beneficial to young people. 
In 2018, parliamentary parties signed an agreement on Lithuanian 
defence policy guidelines. Decisions on the possibility of introducing 
universal military service was scheduled for 2022.34 It is not known when 
the final decision on the universal military service will be made, but the 
Minister of National Defence Arvydas Anušauskas confirmed that, due 
to the poor demographic situation, the universal military service will be 
inevitable.35 How this can change the general tendency of willingness to 
defend the state, so far can only be speculated.
Previously discussed studies suggested that those proud of their 
citizenship are more likely to participate in civic resistance.36 According to 
surveys, in 2020, 62 percent of respondents were proud to be Lithuanian, 
but only 49 percent said they were willing to defend Lithuania. Lack of pride 
in Lithuanian citizenship, lost sense of duty to defend one’s state and low 
trust in political institutions were also mentioned in the 2018 monograph 
“Who would go to defend Lithuania? Civic resistance assumptions and 
possibilities”37. Although comparing the data of different surveys, from 
2018 to 2020, the share of the population being proud citizens of Lithuania 
increased by 4 percent, unfortunately the share of those willing to defend 
the state increased just by 2 percent. One might argue that survey data is 
not reflecting reality, because people of other nationalities also are citizens 
of Lithuania and maybe their national identity is stronger than feeling of 
political association with the political entity.
In fact, ethnic Lithuanians are the dominant majority in Lithuania and 
make up more than 85 percent of the population (Figure 2). At the same 
time, the largest ethnic community consists of Poles (almost 6 percent of the 
population) and Russians (less than 5 percent of the population). Analysis 
of data from a representative public survey38 shows that the proportion of 
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Lithuanians certainly not willing to defend Lithuania remained the same 
(19.4 percent), while the proportion of Russians who certainly would 
not contribute to the country’s defence decreased from 20.1 percent 
to 9.4 percent. The share of Russian respondents who said they would 
defend Lithuania in 2019 was 26.8 percent, and in 2020 only 16.3 percent 
declared willingness to defend the state. However, in the 2019 survey, the 
demographic indicator is the language spoken in the family and only two 
are mentioned (Lithuanian and Russian). In the 2020 survey, the indicator is 
nationality and there are already three categories (Lithuanian, Russian and 
other). It can be assumed that the majority of respondents who declared their 
nationality to be ‘other’ are representatives of the Polish ethnic community, 
as this community is the most numerous in Lithuania. Thus, in 2020, as 
many as 63.9 percent of respondents of other nationalities could not answer 
whether would they defend the state, while 14.1 percent of the respondents 
were willing to defend Lithuania. 
Figure 2. Proportion of population by nationality in relation to the total number of 
permanent residents.39
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Virgilijus Rutkauskas in his 2018 publication assessed individual data from 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and concluded that citizens of the Baltic states 
who lack trust in national governmental institutions or army demonstrate 
less willingness to defend one’s own country.40 According to the data of a 
representative public opinion poll in the Baltic states in 2020, 41 percent of 
respondents in Lithuania trust the government, and only 24 percent trust the 
parliament. In Latvia, 30 percent of respondents trust the government and 
28 percent trust the parliament. In Estonia, on the other hand, 53 percent of 
respondents trust the government and 51 percent trust the parliament.41 Thus, the 
main task should be to increase the trust in political institutions and democracy 
to increase the willingness of the population to defend their homeland.
It is true that when comparing public confidence in the army with trust 
in other institutions, such as the Lithuanian parliament, government or 
justice system, the army is the most trusted national institution (Figure 3). 
According to Eurobarometer surveys, Lithuania’s public trust in the army 
since 2015 has ranged between 70 and 80 percent. The peak of confidence 
was reached in the summer of 2020, and in 2021, 78 percent of the 
respondents expressed their trust in the army. 
Figure 3. Trust of Lithuania’s citizens in national institutions according to Eurobarometer 
surveys.42 
Army Justice system Government Parliament













It is important to mention that, according to the results of surveys 
conducted by national public opinion research companies which are 
included in the annual reports of the Ministry of National Defence, trust 
in the army in September 2021 was 64 percent and almost 11 percent 
distrusted Lithuania’s armed forces (Table 7).
Tend to trust (annual average) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
According to the national 
public opinion research 
companies
54 56 58 60 62 66*
According to Eurobarometer 71 74 75 77 79 78*
Table 7. Dynamics of public trust in the Lithuanian army (percent).43
*Estimated average.
According to Lithuanian National Anti-Poverty Network, in 2020, 
585  thousand people lived below the at-risk of poverty line. It means that 
almost 21 percent of the population received only 430 Eur income per month 
for one person or 904 Eur for a family with two children under 14 years old. 
Income inequality in Lithuania is one of the largest in the European Union. 
It is true that income inequality is declining. In 2015, the income level of 
20 percent of the richest and 20 percent of the poorest people in Lithuania 
differed 7.5 times, in 2020 the difference was 6.1 times.44 Comparing the Baltic 
states income inequality, Latvia and Lithuania rank among the highest in the 
EU,45 however, to determine whether income inequality is a decisive factor in 
why the willingness to defend one’s country is higher in Estonia and lower 
in Lithuania and Latvia, long-term comparative studies should be conducted 
based not only on public survey data but also on qualitative research methods.
Conclusions
In 2015, the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania updated the Strategy 
of preparing the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania for state defence. The 
strategy defines that an integrated system of civic preparation must have two 
complementary elements: the nation’s determination to fight for the country’s 
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independence and resist the aggressor in every possible way, and certain 
knowledge and practical skills required for both civil and armed defence. 
Consequently, one of the main goals of the strategy was to provide two types 
of knowledge to Lithuania’s citizens. Firstly, military training. Secondly, 
knowledge and skills required to participate in civilian resistance.46 The 
surveys discussed earlier illustrate that the experience gained in military 
organizations has a positive effect on the willingness to defend one’s state. 
In general, the greater the number of organizations in which a person 
participates, the greater the willingness to participate in resistance in the 
event of war.47 However, for the resistance to be universal and armed, it is 
necessary to nationally cultivate the military training of young people.
Five years later, the Ministry of National Defence announced a 
draft Strategy of preparing the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania for 
civil resistance, which includes an analysis of strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats. The main identified weakness is the lack 
of knowledge of citizens about participation in state defence and civil 
resistance.48 This indicates that prior strategy was not successfully 
implemented. Moreover, it is noticed that only 50 percent of citizens would 
be willing to be involved in the country’s defence and civil resistance. At the 
same time, in public schools, optional modules dedicated to national defence 
are not popular among students. The main threats to civil resistance that are 
defined in the Draft Strategy is a lack of trust in parliament and government, 
low participation in public organizations and civic activities. The main task 
defined in the Strategy is to introduce values that would promote citizens’ 
identification with the state and patriotism, and willingness to defend one’s 
state.49 Does this mean that Lithuanian citizens are the most unpatriotic of 
all the Baltic states and can this explain the lack of willingness to defend the 
state? In addition, it remains unclear how success will be measured. Would 
60 or 70 percent of the population willing to defend Lithuania be enough? 
Perhaps the explanation for why Lithuanians are the least willing of all 
the Baltic states to defend their state is simpler. The message about threats 
is not being clearly articulated, i.e., it is too abstract just to announce 
that Russia is posing a military threat to Lithuania. As long as people are 
bombarded with discourses of hybrid threats or attacks without a clear 
plan of action for what they could do in their personal lives to contribute 
to national security, it is doubtful that a mere spread of values will make 
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any difference. Knowing that one has a duty to contribute to a country’s 
defence must be based on an understanding of what is threatening the 
country and how specifically it should be acted upon. Another explanation 
is that the message is not reaching the target group. For instance, in 2020, 
the Department of Mobilization and Civil Resistance under the Ministry 
of National Defence issued “The Alphabet of Civil Resistance: Tips for 
Combating Without Weapons.” Only the Lithuanian radio and television 
reported on this publication. Not even one popular internet news site 
informed about the importance of this publication in the educational or civil 
society building process. The publicity of the book was not universal, i.e., no 
social networks, influencers or other modern means of communication were 
used to substantiate its importance for the public. Consequently, one may 
argue that Lithuania’s citizens live in a false sense of existential security. 
Distrust of state institutions and media, especially during the Covid-19 
pandemic, further encourages the population to question all messages that 
the government is trying to send. In this case, a reliable intermediary must 
be used for successful communication. The Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union or 
the National Defence Volunteer Forces could play a greater role not only in 
informing the population, but also in promoting a sense of duty build on the 
motto “the one is not worthy of freedom, who does not protect it”.
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The reasons for willing or not willing to defend own country are many 
and usually case specific. They include but are not limited to the (lack) of 
patriotism and national pride, (dis)trust in state institutions and politicians, 
economic situation and (in)equality, historical grievances and past victories, 
religious and cultural affiliations, education level, gender, ethnicity, political 
and ideological affiliations, and military recruitment models. The level of 
willingness also depends on the nature of a (potential) conflict that the 
society in question is about to face — either one of necessity, or as a choice; 
the former relates to self-defence against immediate threats while the latter 
to more distant threats. These aspects were in detail deliberated in the first 
two chapters by the author of these lines, as well as Dr. Yao-Yuan Yeh.
The level of willingness to defend own country is usually assessed with 
the help of sociological polls. Plenty of them have been conducted in the 
Baltic states. Most of such polls have been organized in Estonia. The least 
data are available for Lithuania. While the methodological approaches and 
questions in such surveys tend to vary, they nevertheless demonstrate some 
consistent trends. Most notably, the level of willingness to defend Estonia 
is the highest. Latvia and Lithuania trail their northern neighbour, as 
further discussed in the chapter “Willingness to Defend the Baltic States in 
Quantitative Terms”.
Reasons for the current situation in the Baltics are multiple and complex. 
Authors of this publication provided their explanations. For Estonia, which 
79
excels not only via a rich pool of data, but also by demonstrating the highest 
willingness level, Dr. Ivo Juurvee puts forth several points. While such 
factors as historical experience, i.e., the Soviet occupation and visibility of 
NATO Allies, are shared with both Latvia and Lithuania, other reasons are 
more Estonia-specific. Among these are the effective integration of military 
and civilian sector, i.e., a mature conscription system, operational reservists’ 
system, and effective military-civilian communication. Another positive 
factor is the Nordic, or more specifically Finnish, influence on the Estonian 
military culture, as well as the governance approach and lifestyle in broader 
terms (as the second chapter of this publication notes, Nordic societies have 
traditionally espoused high levels of willingness to defend own country). 
Nevertheless, a notable issue remains — level of willingness is lower among 
non-Estonians, i.e., Russian speakers. 
In Latvia, the willingness level is lower than in Estonia but higher than in 
Lithuania. That level is neither high nor low in a regional and global context. 
Aleksandra Palkova in her chapter names the main categories of reasons 
that affect the situation. First, a set of detrimental factors — disillusionment 
with political and economic development and the related widespread 
distrust in state institutions and politicians. Second is a mixed factor & 
actor  — Russia. Its military conflict with Ukraine, assertive behaviour 
and negative rhetoric towards Latvia have made a considerable part of the 
Latvian society feel insecure, whereas another part of the society, mostly 
Russian speakers, remain more sympathetic to Russia. Third is an impeding 
mix of physiological and physical factors  — complacency resulting from 
the lack of recent experience of notable conflicts and the lack of military 
training of most people. 
For Lithuania, Dr. Ieva Gajauskaitė suggests taking extra care in 
interpreting the scarce data available on Lithuania. Nevertheless, she 
observes that issues with willingness to defend Lithuania exist. She 
underlines patriotism, pride in the state, as well as specific skills, i.e., 
military experience, and active civil society as the main preconditions for 
willingness to defend own country. To a various degree, in all those aspects 
space for progress in Lithuania remains. Attitude towards the state is a 
broad and complex issue to address. While conscription was reintroduced 
in Lithuania in 2015, its effect on willingness to defend Lithuania has not 
yet reached its full potential. Space for progress in societal attitudes is 
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acknowledged also by the Lithuanian authorities, which treat it primarily in 
the context of civil resistance.
The analyses presented in this book, as well as in other similar studies 
should draw the attention not only of policy makers in the Baltic states 
but also in other NATO member states and beyond. Professional soldiers, 
conscripts and (paramilitary) volunteers are part of the society. Mood 
dominant in the society can have impact on their resolve and determination 
to fight. Furthermore, since patterns of modern conflicts have evolved, 
societies increasingly have become subjected to competing narratives. 
States, at least in the West, have no monopoly over the main channels and 
narratives of information. 
That said, the role of societies and collective and individual willingness 
to defend own country today is even more paramount. While such issues 
are primarily a national responsibility, the concept of resilience in NATO 
has received growing attention. Nevertheless, NATO collectively and its 
member states individually should pay more attention to the societal factors. 
Institutions of some member states, including Latvia and Lithuania, should 
better comprehend the situation in their societies and should seek a more 
subtle balance between slogans and reality about the determination of 
their inhabitants to fight and resist if it came to that. The situation with the 
Covid-19 vaccination rates and the underlying distrust in state institutions 
& their messages serve as yet another indicator that there is space for 
progress. Or else, in an unlikely situation of armed confrontation, support 
from the members of society can disappoint. 
As to how to strive for higher levels of willingness to defend own 
country, there is no one single formula. Estonia’s example and lessons 
from its experience might be a good start for both its southern neighbours. 
Meanwhile, both Estonia and Latvia should continue working towards 
integrated societies. That is, however, a complex mix of issues. Finally, 
the margin between desirable and undesirable methods in enhancing the 
willingness level is subtle. Ideally, members of a society should genuinely 
share the view that their country is worth defending, not merely be 
indoctrinated that the country must be defended.
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